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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-208Q3 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE 
OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS), 
Respondent. 
JAMES P. KEMENASH, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN 
SEIDEL of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Public Employees Federation, 
AFL-CIO (PEF), to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) dismissing its improper practice charge alleging 
that the State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations) (State) violated 
§§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
denied an out-of-title work grievance by unilaterally applying a standard not provided in 
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the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA).1 The parties entered into a 
Stipulation of Facts. The factual record was then reviewed by the Assistant Director 
who dismissed the charge on the grounds that PERB lacked jurisdiction over the 
charge. He found that the parties' CBA, Article 17, was PEF's arguable source of right 
-which was supported by PEF's own conduct. 
PEF excepts to the Assistant Director's decision that the charge is a breach of 
contract claim which was made evident by its own conduct. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Assistant Director. 
The Act does not alter principles of contract law regarding the finality and binding 
effect of terms and conditions upon which full agreement was achieved merely because 
the contract in dispute is a collective bargaining agreement.2 "Once the parties have v--. 
performed their obligation under the [Act] of negotiating to the point of reaching an 
agreement on the subjects expressly covered by the CBA, that exhausts their statutory 
duty to bargain as to those subjects."3 We have expressed this concept as duty 
.
 1There were no exceptions filed as to the dismissal of the §209-a.1 (e) violation. 
(See Exhibit 10 of parties' Stipulation of Facts). Therefore, we need not reach that 
issue. 
2Roma v. Ruffo, 92 N.Y.2d 489, 31 PERB 517504 (1998), rev'g 246 A.D.2d 714 
(3dDep't1998). 
3/d. at 7507. See also County of Nassau, 32 PERB 1)3052 (1999); County of 
Nassau, 31 PERB 1J3074 (1998); County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 31 PERB 1)3064 
(1998). 
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satisfaction.4 Consequently, "when the dispute between the public employer and the . 
employee's representative arises during the term of an existing CBA, the statutory duty 
to bargain collectively [§204 of the Act] and the improper practice of failing to do so in 
good faith [§209-a.1(d) of the Act] apply only when the parties' dispute is outside the 
terms of the CBA, butnof when the condition of employment in question is expressly y 
provided for in the parties'agreement/'5 (emphasis in the original) ' 
Our jurisdiction is constrained by §205.5(d) of the Act which prohibits us from 
exercising jurisdiction over an alleged violation of a CBA. It should be noted that, even 
before this statutory restriction was enacted, we concluded that we should no longer 
treat unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment contained in a CBA 
as a violation of the statutory duty to bargain.6 
In light of our statutory constraint, we have articulated criteria to determine 
whether we have jurisdiction. For instance, we have held that §205.5(d) divests us of 
jurisdiction in a failure to bargain charge where, as here, the parties' CBA provides the 
charging party with a reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the subject 
matter of the charge.7 "[T]he contours of the charging party's contract rights and the 
4State of New York (Dep't of Health), 32 PERB 1J3067 (1999). 
5Roma v. Ruffo, supra at 7508. See also New York City Transit Auth., 25 PERB 
1J3080 (1992); County of Nassau, 25 PERB 1J3071 (1992). 
6St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 1J3058 (1977). The Board there overruled Town 
ofOrangetown, 8 PERB ^3042 (1975), which favored the exercise of jurisdiction over 
contract breaches affecting terms and conditions of employment. 
1
 County of Nassau, supra, n. 5. 
"^ Board - U-20803 -4 
respondent's corresponding obligations need not be laid out in any detail to trigger the 
jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d)."8 
After reviewing the stipulated record, we agree with the decision of the Assistant 
Director. The record included the completed grievance form. This form included two 
boxes which required the grievant to select the type of grievance alleged, i.e-, a 
contract grievance or noncontract grievance. The aggrieved employee selected the 
box for a contract grievance and further indicated Article 17 as the relevant contract 
provision in dispute. The Step 3 grievance appeal was duly authorized by the PEF field 
representative.9 
Article 17 of the parties' CBA clearly discusses the parties' negotiated rights and 
obligations regarding out-of-title work. Albeit that Article 17 does not specifically 
address the particular allegation made in PEF's charge, it is nevertheless apparentthat 
PEF's actions in the grievance process were an acknowledgment that the CBA 
provided PEF with a reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the subject 
matter of the charge. As such, the State has satisfied its duty under the Act to bargain 
regarding out-of-title work. This charge merely presents a dispute over the 
interpretation of Article 17 and is, therefore, beyond this Board's jurisdiction and must 
be dismissed. 
aCity of Troy, 28 PERB 1J3057, at 3131 (1995). 
9Exhibit #2 of the Stipulation of Facts. 
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Based on the foregoing, we deny PEF's exception and affirm the decision of the 
Assistant Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 29, 2000 
Albany, New York 
zf , n 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
A 
bbott, Member 0 ^1 1 / 1 / \/l A X^OJW^ 
! John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-462 
COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENS and 
JEFFREY S. HARTNETT of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Montgomery 
(County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) placing certain part-time 
employees of the County into a unit of full-time County employees represented by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
CSEA represents a unit of approximately 513 full-time County employees. By 
this unit placement petition, CSEA seeks to add to its unit part-time titles which are the 
same as or similar to the full-time titles in the unit. The parties presented the ALJ with a 
stipulation of fact in lieu of a hearing. The stipulation set forth each of the titles sought, 
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the incumbents in the titles, and the hours worked by each in 1997 and from January to 
October 1998. 
There were 67 part-time employees in the at-issue titles working for the County 
in 1997 and 69 in the relevant time period in 1998.1 For analysis, the ALJ broke the 
-— titles down into three occupational groups: the white-collar group of employees in the 
titles of account clerk typist, receptionist and dispatcher; the blue-collar group of 
employees in the titles of cook, food service helper, cleaner, building maintenance 
worker, automotive mechanic, motor vehicle operator and transport aide; and the 
professional group of employees in the titles of licensed professional nurse, nursing 
assistant, leisure time activities aide and physical assistant. The ALJ determined that 
the at-issue employees had regularity and continuity of employment with the County 
that warranted coverage by the Act. The petition was, therefore, granted and the titles 
were placed in the full-time unit represented by CSEA. 
The County excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by utilizing 
a "recurring need" test and not a "statistical" test in determining that the at-issue 
employees were not "casual". The County also argues that the ALJ erred by analyzing 
the employees in "occupational groupings" rather than by "occupational title". CSEA 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
1The titles sought to be added by the petition, as amended, are the following 
part-time titles: account clerk typist, receptionist, senior clerk typist, registered 
professional nurse, licensed practical nurse, nursing assistant, cook, dispatcher, motor 
vehicle operator, food service helper, cleaner, automotive mechanic, building 
') maintenance worker, physical therapy assistant, leisure time activities aide and 
transport aide. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The ALJ's decision sets forth a detailed analysis of the stipulation of facts.2 The 
number of days worked and the hours per week worked are analyzed by the ALJ within 
— the context of occupational groupings of the at-issue titles. The ALJ also analyzes 
hours and days worked during the relevant time frame by all the titles in the group. 
Finally, where relevant, the ALJ assesses the hours and/or days worked by individual 
titles or employees. The ALJ found that the record established that the employees in 
the at-issue part-time titles worked for all or most of the years in question and for at 
least six hours per week in the weeks worked. 
^ As was correctly noted by the ALJ, the controlling factor establishing coverage 
under the Act is regularity and continuity of the employment relationship.3 We have long 
made it clear that the mere number of hours worked per week will not determine 
whether part-time employees are or are not public employees within the meaning of the 
Act. Part-time employees are covered by the Act if there is a substantial and continuing 
employment relationship with the employer.4 Generally speaking, the test employed by 
the Board is to determine the regularity of the employment relationship. 
232PERB 1J4022 (1999). 
^Village ofDryden, 22 PERB 1J3035 (1989). 
4
 Somers Cent. Sch. Dist, 12 PERB 1J3068 (1979). 
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) 
Seasonal employees or those who do not work a full year may also have a 
sufficient relationship with their employer to establish their public employee status. 
The test we have applied to seasonal employees was first articulated in State of New 
York (hereafter, State of New York).5 Under State of New York, seasonal employment is 
casual and not covered by the Act, if: 1) the season is shorter than six-weeks a year, or ^ 
2) the employees are required to work fewer than twenty hours a week during the 
season, or 3) fewer than 60% of the employees in the title return for at least two 
successive (consecutive) seasons. In Town of Brookhaven6 (hereafter, Town of 
Brookhaven), where we considered the coverage to be afforded to a group of seasonal 
employees, specifically lifeguards, we eliminated the third prong of the test, the rate of 
A return, as we were there "persuaded that the rate of return test is inherently confusing 
and often incapable of the easy application intended when the test was formulated."7 
Here, the County argues that the ALJ was required to utilize the quantitative test 
of State of New York to determine whether the at-issue employees should be afforded 
coverage by the Act. That decision is not applicable to all-year employees.8 Where 
employees regularly work for all or most of the work year, there is created "a substantial 
55PERB H3022(1972). 
630PERB H3040(1997). 
Id. at 3090. 
8See Amityville Public Schools, 5 PERB 1J3043 (1972). 
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interest in terms and conditions of employment warranting coverage under the [Act]."9 
Employees in job titles which are regularly scheduled for employment during all or most 
of the work year are usually, by that connection alone, removed from the group of 
employees who work only during a specific "season".10 Such "seasonal" employees are 
those to whom the quantitative analysis ofState of New York, as modified by our 
decision in Town of Brookhaven, must be applied. 
That being said, a quantitative or statistical analysis may be helpful in 
determining whether the employment of part-time employees is regular and continuous 
and supports their coverage by the Act.11 Obviously, one element of regular and 
continuous employment is the number of hours worked weekly or monthly, the number 
of days worked weekly or monthly, the number of months worked in the year and the 
number of years the occupational title has existed and been filled by members of the 
employer's work force. Our decision in Village ofDryden12 clearly illustrates the nature 
of this quantitative analysis and its part in the overall assessment of the employment 
9See SomersCent. Sch. Dist, 12 PERB P068, at 3120 (1979), where the Board 
determined that the 12.5 -17.5 hours per week worked by some part-time employees 
did not affect their status as covered public employees because, working steadily 
throughout the work year, they worked "on a regular and substantial basis" and they 
had a "sufficient employment relationship to be covered employees" (at 3120-21). 
10See Village ofDryden, 22 PERB P035, aff'g 22 PERB fl4004 (1989) 
(hereafter Village ofDryden), where we held that the Director correctly declined to apply 
the seasonal test to part-time employees who work year round and are covered if their 
employment characteristics evidence regular and continuous employment. 
uld. 
nSupra note 1. 
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relationship between part-time employees and their employer. There, we considered 
the employment status of a group of part-time police officers employed by the Village. 
The record evidenced that the part-time officers, when analyzed as a group, averaged 
13.3 hours monthly in 1986-87, 21.3 hours monthly in 1987-88 and 35 hours monthly 
for the first quarter of 1988-89, We found there that the statistics established that the 
part-time officers, as a group, held regular and continuous employment with the Village. 
We held that the Director properly recognized that the number of hours worked is but 
one of several factors to be considered in assessing the regularity and continuity of the 
employees' employment relationship. 
Here, as the ALJ found, employees in the part-time titles work for the County 
throughout the year and year-to-year. They hold titles the same as or similar to the full-
time employees; indeed, several of the part-time employees fill in for full-time 
employees who are out and some have moved from their part-time titles to full-time 
employment in the same or similar title with the County. All of the employees, save the 
registered professional nurse who conducts immunization clinics in the public heath 
department on a regular monthly schedule, are scheduled to work weekly. The 
employees work from 6 hours per week to over 20 hours per week. Even those working 
only 6 hours per week work more hours per month than did the part-time police officers 
in Village of Dryden.™ 
13However, as in Village ofDryden, the seasonal test, the second prong of which 
requires that an employee work at least 20 hours per week, is clearly inapplicable here. 
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The County's second exception, that the ALJ erred by considering the 
employees within three occupational groupings, ie., white-collar, blue-collar and 
professional, rather than by occupational title must also be denied. The ALJ considered 
the hours worked, the weeks worked and the years worked by occupational groupings. 
In Town ofBrookhaven, we affirmed the Director's uniting determination, utilizing, in 
part, an analysis on the basis of "occupational grouping". We have previously held that 
once a nexus of the occupational group to the employer has been found sufficient to 
award public employee status, such status is accorded to the group as a whole.14 In any 
event, the ALJ here also analyzed the group of part-time employees as a whole and to 
some degree, by individual title, where necessary. 
The unit placement sought by the petition is granted and the titles of part-time 
account clerk typist, receptionist, senior clerk typist, registered professional nurse, 
licensed practical nurse, nursing assistant, cook, dispatcher, motor vehicle operator, 
food service helper, cleaner, automotive mechanic, building maintenance worker, 
physical therapy assistant, leisure time activities aide and transport aide are hereby 
placed in the unit represented by CSEA.15 
uState of New York, supra; BOCES III, Suffolk County, 15 PERB 1J3015 (1982), 
confd sub nom. BOCES III Faculty Ass'n v. PERB, 92 A.D. 2d 937, 16 PERB ^7015 (2d 
Dep't 1983). 
15lnasmuch as the addition of the part-time employees to CSEA's unit does not 
bring into question its continuing majority status, no election is ordered. See New York 
Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 27 PERB P034 (1994). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ's decision is affirmed and the 
County's exceptions are dismissed. 
DATED: February 29, 2000 
Albany, New York 
'Lw^&^KjL^''ir^ f7r?r~^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CRAWFORD POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, ....._.._.._ _ 
- and - CASE NO. CP-606 
TOWN OF CRAWFORD, 
Employer. 
JOHN K. GRANT, ESQ., for Petitioner 
JACOBOWITZ & GUBITS, LLP (DONALD G. NICHOL of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Crawford Police 
Benevolent Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing its unit placement petition seeking to add the title of sergeant to its unit 
of full-time and part-time police officers employed by the Town of Crawford (Town). The 
Town opposed the petition asserting that the sergeant's supervisory responsibilities 
made the placement of the sergeant in the rank-and-file unit inappropriate. 
The Town employs six full-time and seven part-time police officers, one sergeant 
and a chief of police in its Police Department. The parties stipulated at the hearing 
before the ALJ that the only issue to be decided was whether the sergeant's 
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supervisory responsibilities are sufficient to preclude such accretion of the sergeant's 
title into the rank-and-file unit. 
The ALJ found that the sergeant should be excluded from the unit because he is 
second-in-command to the chief, assumes the chiefs duties when he is absent and 
performs department-wide supervisory functions with respect to schedules, approval of 
overtime and shift exchanges, review of reports of subordinate officers, evaluations, 
recommendations for both discipline and retention of probationary employees, and the 
handling of major occurrences, such as homicides. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that there are other 
employees in the unit who perform the same or similar supervisory responsibilities as 
the sergeant, that the sergeant's supervisory responsibilities are not of the level to 
cause a conflict of interest and that to not include the sergeant in the rank-and-file unit 
is to effectively deny him representation because the Act does not permit for a unit of 
one employee. The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The record shows that the chief, the sergeant and the senior officer on duty are 
each responsible for supervising one of the three work shifts of unit employees. 
Supervision of the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift is the extent of the supervisory 
responsibilities of the senior officer on duty. The sergeant, however, has additional, 
department-wide responsibilities as the second-in-command of the police department. 
Board - CP-606 -3 
Whether he is on duty or not, the sergeant is contacted first whenever there is a 
need for approval of overtime or an exchange of shifts. Likewise, in the event of a 
"major occurrence" such as a homicide or a fatal accident, the sergeant is the first to be 
contacted to make command decisions. The sergeant may approve the purchase of 
equipment and supplies valued up to $15CLand approve the expenditure oitraveLfunds. 
All evaluations of police officers are completed by the sergeant and then forwarded to 
the chief. The chief first discusses with the sergeant any discipline issues and the 
retention of probationary police officers. The sergeant also reviews reports prepared by 
the police officers and makes special duty assignments. Such responsibilities have 
historically and consistently formed a sufficient basis for excluding supervisory 
employees from bargaining units in initial uniting cases.1 
While other police officers are responsible for the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift 
when they are the senior officer in charge and may have input into the chiefs decision 
to retain a probationary employee if they have been that probationary employee's 
training officer, that is really the extent of the supervisory functions performed by police 
officers other than the sergeant. As found by the ALJ, the sergeant exercises significant 
supervisory responsibilities on a department-wide basis. We have long held that such 
1See, e.g., Village ofDryden, 22 PERB1J4004, aff'd on other grounds, 22 PERB 
1J3035 (1989); State of New York (Div. of Military and Naval Affairs), 19 PERB 1J3008 
(1986), affg 18 PERB 1J4075 (1985); Johnson City Cent. Sch. Dist., 1 PERB fl399.55 
(1968). See also Bd.ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo, 14 PERB 
P051 (1981). 
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supervisors should be excluded from a unit of rank-and-file employees.2 Here, where 
there is only one level of supervision between the rank-and-file employees and the 
chief,3 where that level of supervision is significant, and where the Town opposes the 
inclusion of the sergeant in the unit represented by the Association,4 the ALJ correctly 
determined that the sergeant should not be placed in the rank-and-file unit. 
Finally, the Association asserts that dismissal of its petition deprives the sergeant 
of representation rights because we do not create units of one employee. It argues that 
deprivation of representation rights warrants placement of the sergeant in the rank-and-
file unit. Alternatively, the Association argues that, contrary to current case law, we 
should create a unit of sergeants even though it would result in a unit of one employee. 
We long ago held that one-person units are not appropriate in Auburn Industrial 
Development Authority,5 where we adopted the reasoning of the National Labor 
Relations Board that "the principle of collective bargaining presupposes that :• 
2See State of New York (Div. of State Police), 1 PERB 1(399.32 (1968). See also 
Town ofCarmel, 31 PERB 1J3047 (1998); Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist, 16 PERB 1J3083 
(1983); Bd. ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo, 14 PERB 1J3051 (1981) 
and 16 PERB 1J3084 (1983). 
3See State of New York (Div. of Military and Naval Affairs), supra note 1. 
4See Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist, 21 PERB 1J3060 (1988) (subsequent 
history omitted). 
515 PERB 1J3139 (1982). 
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there is more than one eligible person who desires to bargain."6 That our determination 
leaves the sergeant unrepresented does not warrant a contrary finding.7 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: February 29, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ jjohn T. Mitchell, Member 
6MGM Studios, 2 LRRM 323, at 327 (1938). 
7See Chatauqua County and Chatauqua County Sheriff, 26 PERB P070 (1993); 
Town of Carmel, supra note 2. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF MAMARONECK POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20269 
TOWN OF MAMARONECK, *>. 
Respondent. 
GOODSTEIN & WEST (ROBERT DAVID GOODSTEIN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (CRAIG R. BENSON of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Mamaroneek Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision 
dismissing its improper practice charge alleging, as amended, that the Town of 
Mamaroneek (Town) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it assigned certain clerical duties performed exclusively by employees in 
the unit represented by the PBA to a nonunit employee of the Town. 
. After reviewing the PBA's offer of proof, the ALJ determined that the nonunit 
employee was a civilian. In light of that revelation, the ALJ concluded that the facts of 
this charge fell within the parameters of our prior "civilianization" decisions involving unit 
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work transfer from a unit of uniformed police officers to "civilian" employees. The ALJ 
dismissed the charge. 
The PBA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ misapplied the civilianization 
precedents. After reviewing the record and considering the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Our decision in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority1 (hereafter Niagara 
Frontier) first articulated the analysis used to evaluate the propriety of a transfer of "unit 
work" charge. We held that: 
[w]ith respect to the unilateral transfer of unit work, the initial 
essential questions are [1] whether the work had been 
performed by unit employees exclusively and [2] whether the 
reassigned tasks are substantially similar to those previously 
performed by unit employees. If both these questions are 
answered in the affirmative... [sic] there had been a violation 
of §209-a.1 (d), unless the qualifications for the job have 
been changed significantly. Absent such a change, the loss 
of unit work to the group is sufficient detriment for the finding 
of a violation. If, however, there has been a significant 
change in the job qualifications, then a balancing test is 
invoked; the interests of the public employer and the unit 
employees, both individually and collectively, are weighed 
against each other.2 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) 
Niagara Frontier analyzed our earlier civilianization cases where we held that a 
change from uniformed personnel to civilian personnel resulted in a change in 
qualifications, and two other decisions in which we held that the employer's decision to 
118PERB H3083(1985). 
2ld. at 3182. 
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alter the level of service it provided to its constituency by utilizing employees who had 
higher qualifications was nonmandatory.3 
In our decision in State of New York (Department of Correctional Services),4 we 
further clarified the analysis to be-utilized in a transfer of unit work case involving a 
transfer of work performed by uniformed personnel to civilian personnel. We there held 
that "the reassignment of police duties to civilians was the result of a [realization by the 
employer of the need to] change the qualifications deemed necessary by the employer 
to perform the duties, as well as a concomitant change in the level of service to be 
offered by the employer."5 
Our recent decision in Fairview Fire District decided the issue presented by the 
PBA in this charge. In this case,' it was not until the PBA made its offer of proof 
regarding the status, qualifications and duties performed by the civilian that the ALJ 
learn that the uniformed unit work had been transferred to a civilian. The PBA had 
3See Town of Brookhaven, 17 PERB ^[3087 (1984) [change in qualifications 
represented employer's decision to alter the level of service]; Avoca Cent. Sen. Dist, 15 
PERB 1J3128 (1982) [change in qualifications but similar job duties]; West Hempstead 
Union Free Sch. Dist, 14 PERB 1J3096 (1981) [reassignment of duties related to 
change in level of services was nonmandatory]. See also City of New Rochelle, 13 
PERB ^3045 (1980) [fundamental management right to determine necessary 
employment qualifications of personnel performing tasks]; City of Albany, 13 PERB 
1J3011 (1980) [absence of detriment to individual unit employees was significant factor]; 
County of Suffolk, 12 PERB p i 23 (1979) [the employer has the right to change 
qualifications] 
427 PERB 1J3055 (1994), aff'd, 220 A.D. 2d 19, 29 PERB fl7008 (3d Dep't 1996). 
5ld. at 3125. 
629 PERB P042 (1996). 
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argued that there was no need to apply a balancing test because the qualifications for 
the position had not changed. 
The PBA has misinterpreted our decision in Fairview wherein we harmonized the 
essential issues presented in.the various civilianization cases. We noted in Fairview 
that we recognize civilians lack the "special employment qualifications'- of uniform 
officers. However, "the substitution of civilians for police officers or fire fighters to 
deliver services previously performed by those uniformed personnel necessarily reflects 
an employer's determination that the specialized training and skills of the uniformed 
officer are not necessary to the performance of a given set of tasks, e.g., dispatch."8 It 
is the substitution of a civilian for a uniformed officer with "special employment 
qualifications" that triggers the balancing test.9 v 
Lastly, the PBA in its exceptions argues that the duties performed by the civilian 
nonunit employee have not been permanently civilianized because when the civilian 
employee is absent from work, the duties may be performed by unit employees. The 
ALJ's conclusion to the contrary is correct, notwithstanding the ALJ's reference to 
Spencer-Van Etten Central School District™ We have held that a union does not 
7Id. at 3098; see also County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 29 PERB 1J3031 
(1996), [police officers are "fundamentally different from everyone else"]. 
^Fairview Fire Disi., supra at 3098-99. 
9The ALJ concluded that in balancing the interests of the parties, there was no 
detriment to the PBA unit because a civilian had been assigned unit work. The PBA 
took no specific exception to this finding and, therefore, we do not have to reach this 
issue in our decision. 
'20 PERB 1J4612 (1987), aff'd on other grounds, 21 PERB 1J3015 (1988). 
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reestablish exclusivity over unit work previously performed by thereafter performing on 
a limited basis the work now performed by nonunit employees.11 
It is for those reasons that we deny the PBA's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge berand it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 29, 2000 
Albany, New York 
0i^L^^t^<^CU^4 *•<=—• 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
7 MarcX Abbott, IvTember 
/ J^ »hn T. Mitchell, Member 
/ . 
"CityofNewburgh, 29 PERB P039 (1996). See also City of Buffalo, 24 PERB 
1J3043 (1991), citing New York City Transit Auth., 20 PERB 1J3025 (1987).' 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Frances Jenkins to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
her improper practice charge. The charge, sworn to September 10, 1999, alleged that 
the Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100 (TWU) violated §209-a.2(a), (b) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to afford her 
proper representation at a disciplinary arbitration hearing. Jenkins' employer, the New 
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York City Transit Authority (TA), is made a party to this proceeding pursuant to §209-
a.3oftheAct.1 
Jenkins was employed by the TA as a conductor. On March 2, 1999, she 
opened the doors on the wrong side of her train. She was suspended pending further 
disciplinary action which resulted in dismissal from employment. On April 20, 1999, a 
tripartite arbitration board heard her appeal of the penalty of dismissal. An award 
issued on that date sustaining the charge to which Jenkins had admitted. However, the 
board modified the penalty to a demotion to a nonsafety sensitive position. The 
demotion took effect of May 12, 1999. 
On September 16, 1999, the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) wrote to Jenkins informing her that the charge 
was deficient and would not be processed. The September 16,1999 letter included a 
deficiency notice informing Jenkins of the specific deficiencies with the charge, 
including, among other things: 
[A] charge must be filed within four months of the alleged act(s) of 
misconduct. This charge was mailed on September 13, which is 
more than four months after the May 12 date of demotion and the 
April 20 arbitration hearing. 
1Section 209-a.3 of the Act provides that: 
[t]he public employer shall be made a party to any charge 
filed under [209-a.2] which alleges that the duly recognized 
or certified employee organization breached its duty of fair 
representation in the processing of or failure to process a 
claim that the public employer has breached its agreement 
with such employee organization. 
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On October 5, 1999, the Assistant Director received a letter from counsel 
retained by Jenkins. The Assistant Director gave them until October 20, 1999 to cure 
the deficiencies. On October 20, 1999, Jenkins submitted an amended charge. On 
October 25, 1999, the Assistant Director, by letter, informed Jenkins' counsel that the 
amended charge was deficient. The amended charge had not cured the untimeliness 
of the charge. 
On November 30, 1999, the Director issued his decision dismissing the charge. 
We agree. 
Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) mandates that 
improper practice charges be filed within four months of the date of the conduct which 
is the subject of the charge. While the Rules pertaining to the filing of exceptions to the 
decisions by the Director and Administrative Law Judges provide for extensions of time 
because of extraordinary circumstances (§213.4),2 the Rules do not provide for any 
extension of time to file an improper practice charge. 
2Auburn Indus. Dev. Auth., 15 PERB.1J3075 (1982). For other cases discussing 
attempts to toll the four-month limitation of time, see New York City Transit Auth. (Dye), 
30 PERB 1J3032 (1997) (allegations of misconduct of Transit Authority more than four 
months after disciplinary hearing); State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee 
Relations), 22.PERB 1J3009 (1989) (four-month limitation in Rules runs from the date 
the adverse action took place and not from the date when improper motivation is 
ascribed to it); Bd. ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 19 PERB 
1J3066 (1986) (exhaustion of administrative review proceedings); Transit Workers 
Union, Local 100, (Connolly), 28 PERB 1J4678 (1995) (attempts to resolve dispute 
through internal union procedure rejected); Public Employees Fed'n (Reese), 26 PERB 
1J4589 (1993) (illness preventing timely filing rejected); Port Jefferson Teachers Ass'n 
(Handler), 20 PERB 1J4508 (1987) (charge alleging union's negligence prevented timely 
filing rejected). 
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The Assistant Director's letter of September 16, 1999 informed Jenkins that one 
of the deficiencies was the untimeliness of the charge. It was filed more than four 
months after the demotion which occurred on May 12, 1999 and the April 20, 1999 
arbitration hearing. Any dispute Jenkins had with the TWU is measured from these 
dates in order to comply with the four-month limitation of time set forth in the Rules.3 
Based on the foregoing, Jenkins' exceptions in the form of an appeal are denied 
and the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is1, 
dismissed. 
DATED: February 29, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
3Since the Director's dismissal of the charge on the grounds of untimeliness has 
been upheld, we need not reach any of the other issues raised in Jenkins' appeal. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Gates Highway Department 
Foremen's Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on improper practice charges alleging that the Town of Gates (Town) had violated 
§§209-a.1 (a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
retaliating against three of its members for engaging in protected activities under the 
Act. 
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The ALJ found that Alfred Leone, Jr., Stephen Leone and John DiBitetto were 
engaged in protected activity, at least from March 19971 through the conclusion of the 
certification proceeding. The Town and its officials were clearly aware of this activity. 
The ALJ, however, found that the disciplinary action taken against the Leones and 
DiBitetto was not causally related to their protected activity. In other words, the "but for" 
part of the test had not been met.2 
The ALJ concluded that the Association failed to prove any nexus between 
protected activity and the adverse employment actions taken against these individuals 
by the Town. It appeared from the testimony that a great deal of animosity and : .• 
antagonism developed between Alfred, Jr., and Stephen Leone, and the Town 
Supervisor, Ralph D. Esposito, resulting from the suspension and ultimate resignation 
of Alfred Leone, Sr.,3 and that this relationship degenerated into conflict between these 
parties. The ALJ's assessment of the parties' demeanor during the hearings supported 
testimony describing this conflict. Consequently, the ALJ opined that the facts 
developed at the hearing regarding the parties' conduct do not support a finding that 
1Tow7 of Gates, 31 PERB 1J4008 (1998). (On March 14, 1997, the Gates 
Highway Department Foremen's Association filed a petition seeking to represent 
foremen employed by the Town of Gates in the highway department. The International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 118 (Teamsters), as well as the Town, opposed the 
petition). See Town of Gates, 14 PERB 1J3000.41 (1981). (Teamsters certified as 
exclusive negotiating representatives for certain titles including foremen). 
2See County of Nassau, 27 PERB P011 (1994), where we articulated the 
elements necessary to prove violations of §§209-a.1(a) and (c). 
3Alfred Leone, Sr., was the previous Town Highway Superintendent. 
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the Town's actions were motivated by the filing of the petition for certification. The ALJ 
dismissed the charges. 
The Association excepts to the dismissal of the charges on several grounds: the 
ALJ's finding that there was no nexus between the protected activity and the action 
taken against Alfred Leone, Jr., Stephen Leone and John DiBitetto; the ALJ's finding of 
no anti-union animus in the record; the ALJ's finding that the animosity that existed 
between the parties was the result of the suspension of Alfred Leone, Sr., by Esposito; 
the ALJ's holding that the facts cannot support a finding that the Town's1 and Esposito's 
actions were motivated by the filing of the petition for certification. Lastly, the 
Association excepts tothe ALJ's holding that the Town's reason for the disciplinary 
actions taken against the Leones and DiBitetto was not pretextual. The Town has not 
responded. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' . 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The ALJ's findings may be summarized as follows: 
On March 3, 1997, Stephen Leone was appointed Acting Superintendent of 
Highways for the Town by its Supervisor, Esposito. Stephen's father, Alfred A. Leone, 
Sr., the long-time Highway Superintendent, had been suspended and was under 
investigation. Leone, Sr. subsequently retired. Stephen Leone and Alfred Leone, Jr. 
had served under their father's supervision for about twenty years. Leone, Sr.'s 
disciplinary problem received much media attention. 
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On March 14, 1997, the Association organized to represent the five foremen 
employed by the Highway Department. There was a showing of interest by four of the 
five foremen — Alfred Leone, Jr., Stephen Leone, John R. DiBitetto and Lester A. 
Beach. Michael Leone chose not to sign the petition.4 The petition was opposed by the 
Town and the Teamsters, The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissed the Association's petition and placed the foremen ., 
into the unit represented by the Teamsters.5 
The record demonstrates that, in June 1997, which preceded the hearing on the 
representation petition (October 3, 1997 and November 10, 1997), Stephen Leone's 
wife, Elizabeth, began her campaign for Town Supervisor, challenging Esposito. 
The election campaign of 1997 for Town Supervisor pitted the Leone family 
against the incumbent Esposito. Esposito testified unequivocally that he was 
concerned with the election and his interaction with the Leones. With the election 
looming in the foreground, Esposito removed Stephen Leone from the Acting 
Superintendent of Highways position on June 25, 1997. 
Esposito testified that he offered the position to DiBitetto as a way of bridging the 
gap between the Leones and the administration. Esposito, upon offering the job to 
DiBitetto, reminded him that Elizabeth Leone did not have a prayer of winning the 
election. 
4See supra, n. 1 and accompanying text. 
5Town of Gates, 31 PERB 1(4008 (1998). 
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After accepting the offer, DiBitetto called Esposito and declined the position. 
Esposito at this point had lost confidence in DiBitetto. This loss of confidence was 
pivotal in Esposito's determination of which foreman was to be demoted after the 
election. It was Esposito's opinion that the Town had too many foremen and that either 
DiBitetto or one other foreman would be demoted. 
It is against the backdrop of the election campaign, not the petition for 
certification, that the stage was set for the disciplinary actions that subsequently -
occurred to the Leone brothers and DiBitetto.6 
The Act gives public employees the right to form, join or participate in an 
employee organization of their choosing and to be represented by the employee 
organization of their choosing with respect to their terms and conditions of 
employment.7 It has been held that any interference and/or discrimination arising out of 
an employee's participation in organizational activity would invoke the protections of the 
Act.8 
It is well-settled that the elements necessary to prove a case of discrimination for 
union activity under the Act are that the affected individual was engaged in protected 
6The ALJ's decision enunciates the various acts of misconduct with which the 
Leone brothers and DiBitettos were charged. 
7Act, §202 and §203. 
8Section 209-a.1(c); see Rosen v. PERB, 72 N.Y.2d 42, 21 PERB 1J7014 (1988); 
Town of Gates, 15 PERB P079 (1982) (Town highway employee, Albert Sava, 
suspended and thereafter discharged by Alfred Leone, Sr. because of his activities on 
behalf of the successful organizing efforts of the Teamsters). See supra n. 1* Town of 
Gates, 14 PERB ^3000.41 (1981). 
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activity, that such activity was known to the person(s) making the adverse employment 
decision, and that the action would not have been taken but for the protected activity.9 
The existence of anti-union animus may be established by statements or by 
circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by presentation of legitimate business 
reasons for the action taken, unless found to be pretextual.10 
It is undisputed that the Town knew by March 14, 1997 that Alfred Leone, Jr., 
Stephen Leone and John DiBitetto had formed the Association to organize and 
represent the five foremen in the Highway Department. The ALJ then determined that 
the "but for" part of the test was not satisfied. There was no showing by the Association 
of a nexus between the representation petition in March 1997 (protected activity) and 
the subsequent disciplinary actions taken by the Town against these three individuals. 
Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the charge must be dismissed. We agree. 
In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ found the credible evidence supported his 
findings. The ALJ based his determination on a full examination of the demeanor of the 
witnesses, especially Michael Leone.11 The record demonstrates that the Leones were 
9See Town of North Hempstead, 32 PERB 1J3006 (1999). 
1C
"City of Salamanca, 18 PERB jf3012 (1985). 
11See Daws v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 41.8 
([T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of confrontation [cross-examination]; 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 ([T]he value of cross-examination lies in its use to 
expose falsehood and bring out the truth); "[TJhe opponent demands confrontation, not 
for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for 
the purpose of cross-examination," 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1395, p. 123 (3rd Ed. 
1940). 
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not unfamiliar with disciplinary action as the result of organizing efforts. In 1982, Alfred 
Leone, Sr. discharged an employee who assisted the Teamsters in organizing the 
employees of the highway department, which included foremen. 
Since the foremen were already represented, the Teamsters joined the Town to 
oppose the Association's petition, supported by the Leones and others in March 1997. 
Esposito testified unequivocably that he was more interested in the outcome of 
the general election for Town Supervisor. His opponent was none other than Stephen 
Leone's wife, Elizabeth. It was obvious from Esposito's testimony that the general 
election, not the representation petition, was the catalyst for conflict between the 
Leones, DiBitetto and himself. 
Therefore, on the record before us, we find no merit to the exceptions as the 
Association failed to establish a causal nexus between the protected activity and the 
Town's disciplinary action taken against the Leone brothers and DiBitetto: We have 
held that every adverse action taken by an employer does not and cannot be said to be 
transformed into an improperly motivated one as defined by the Act and thereby result 
in a violation.12 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
^
2Erie County Water Auth., 26 PERB 1J4604 (1993), aff'd, 27 PERB 1J3010 
(1994). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and they hereby are, 
dismissed. 
DATED: February 29, 2000 
Albany, New York 
^ 
<Ui 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
IvIafcAV Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its petition for unit clarification and unit 
placement. The petition sought a determination that substitute bus drivers employed by 
the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District (District) are or should be placed in 
CSEA's existing unit of custodial, maintenance and transportation personnel. The 
District opposes the petition. . 
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The ALJ held that the substitute bus drivers were not encompassed within the 
unit recognition clause in the CSEA-District contract and dismissed the unit clarification 
aspect of the petition. As to unit placement, the ALJ determined that the substitute bus 
drivers were "casual" employees not entitled to representation under the Act. 
Alternatively, hefoundthat-evenjtthe-substitute-bus drivers are covered-employees,1 
the disparity in the benefits received by the substitutes as compared with unit 
employees would likely result in a conflict of interest inimical to collective bargaining. 
CSEA has filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the contractual 
recognition clause encompasses the title of substitute bus driver,2 that the substitute 
bus drivers are not "casual" employees, that the substitute bus drivers have received 
letters of "reasonable assurance of continued employment" from the District which 
alone warrants a finding that they are "covered" employees and, finally, that the 
disparity in benefits received by the substitute bus drivers does not, in and of itself, 
compel a finding that the substitute bus drivers are not appropriately placed in CSEA's 
unit. The District supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based on our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
1The substitute bus drivers receive a letter of reasonable assurance of continued 
employment such as to make them ineligible for receipt of unemployment insurance 
benefits pursuant to Labor Law, §590.10 and may, therefore, be covered employees 
pursuant to §201.7(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
2Although not listed separately in its exceptions, this argument was raised in 
CSEA's brief in support of its exceptions, filed simultaneously with its exceptions. 
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The parties presented the case to the ALJ for decision on stipulations of fact and 
briefs. The 1996-1999 collective bargaining agreement between CSEA and the District 
was also made part of the record. In relevant part, it provides as follows: 
Article 1. Recognition and Definition of Titles 
_; , A Recognition 
The Employer recognizes CSEA as the sole 
and exclusive representative of all custodial, 
maintenance, and transportation personnel, 
excluding the Director of Buildings and 
Grounds, the Director of Transportation, the 
Assistant Director of Transportation, the 
Transportation Dispatcher, the Maintenance 
Foreman, and the Head Mechanic, for the 
purpose of collective negotiations for all terms 
and conditions of employment and the 
administration of grievances. This recognition 
shall continue for the maximum period 
permissible under the Taylor Law. 
B. Personnel Defined 
1. Full-time custodial and transportation employees shall 
be defined as those individuals working in excess of 
twenty (20) hours and five (5) days per week, 
regardless of on a ten-(10) or twelve-(12) month basis 
but excluding bus drivers. 
2. Part-time custodial personnel shall be defined as 
those working on a regular daily basis less than 
twenty (20) hours per week. 
3. Permanent drivers are those individuals who are 
permanently routed. 
4. Substitute drivers are defined as those individuals not 
permanently routed. They are entitled to no seniority 
or benefits. 
Notwithstanding the general, all-inclusive, language of the recognition clause 
and the more specific language of the personnel definition section set forth above, the 
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ALJ found that substitute bus drivers were not part of the unit defined in the collective 
bargaining agreement. The ALJ based his determination that the title of substitute bus 
driver was not encompassed within the scope of the bargaining unit on the fact that 
CSEA had never negotiated for the substitute bus drivers nor were there any contract 
provJsioDs_reJatedioJhem,.hadJled_no..grievances.Qn.theJr_behalf_and_had_noi,cQHecte_d_ 
dues or agency fees from the substitute bus drivers at any time since the inception of 
the unit in 1975. 
A unit clarification petition seeks only a factual 
determination as to whether a job title is actually 
encompassed within the scope of the petitioner's unit. We 
have held a unit clarification petitioner to a burden of proof 
on its petition because that particular type of petition 
necessarily seeks only a determination of fact, [footnote 
omitted] A unit clarification petition differs from a unit 
placement petition.... [0]nly the unit placement petition puts 
the appropriateness of the unit under §207 of the Act in 
issue. Moreover, the unit placement petition proceeds from 
the finding or admission that the position in issue is not in 
the petitioner's unit, but should be most appropriately placed 
there. The uniting criteria set forth in §207 of the Act can be 
material to the disposition of the fact question which 
underlies the unit clarification petition, but only if and to the 
extent they evidence the actual scope of the bargaining 
unit.3 
Here, the recognition clause in the parties' collective bargaining agreement 
defines the unit in general terms of "all... transportation personnel". Were that the only 
language referring to the makeup of the bargaining unit, the rationale used by the ALJ 
wouid be appropriate. He reviewed the contract for other terms that appiied to 
3
 State of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control), 24 PERB ff3019, at 3038 
(1991). 
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substitute bus drivers and found none. He, therefore, looked to the treatment of that title 
by the parties and determined that CSEA had never sought dues or agency fees 
transmittals for these employees from the District, had never put forth negotiations 
proposals for these employees and had never filed any grievances on behalf of the 
substitute-bus drivers. Relyingon-our-decisioninCoL/n^otMagfarai, he-determined-
that because there was no evidence that the parties had ever considered the substitute 
bus drivers to be encompassed within the scope of the existing unit, the unit clarification 
aspect of the petition should be dismissed. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that an analysis of whether the parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement have considered a title to be within the scope of the 
bargaining unit is appropriate only where the express provisions of the recognition 
clause are ambiguous and that such is not the case here. We agree. 
As was stated in Orange County and Sheriff of Orange County5, a "unit 
clarification petition raises only a fact question as to whether [existing] personnel are 
included in [the] existing unit." Here, there is a general definition of the unit in the 
recognition clause including "all custodial, maintenance, and transportation personnel", 
but there also follows a provision defining "personnel". That clause further defines titles 
which are indisputably within the bargaining unit - full-time custodial employees, part-
time custodial employees, and permanent bus drivers. One other group of employees is 
421 PERB 1J3030 (1988). 
525 PERB 1J3049 at 3104 (1992), conf'd sub nom. Orange County Deputy 
Sheriff's Ass'n v. PERB, 26 PERB 1T7004 (Sup. Ct. Rockland Co. 1993). 
Board - CP-574 -6 
included within the definition of personnel and that is the substitute bus drivers at-issue 
in this proceeding. 
A review of the few Board decisions that have addressed unit clarification 
petitions reveals no cases in which the recognition clause specifically defines the unit 
—bytit leand the title inJssue is-included within the recognition clause. Rather,Jhe , 
decisions deal with general recognition clauses, including all employees6 or all 
employees within certain classifications.7 As a result, in those cases, the inquiry went 
beyond the language of the recognition clause to determine whether any other 
contractual language either covered or specifically excluded the at-issue title. In the 
absence of any relevant contractual language, the parties' practice with respect to the 
at-issue title or similar titles was reviewed to ascertain the parties' intent.8 
Such an inquiry is not necessary nor is it appropriate in this case. Here, the 
parties have specifically defined the bargaining unit as including substitute bus drivers. 
No other meaning can be given to the reference to the substitute bus drivers in the 
definition of personnel. In fact, the definition clause also sets forth the terms of the 
contract applicable to the substitute bus drivers by stating: "They are entitled to no 
6See County of Niagara, supra note 4. See also General Brown Cent. Sch. Dist, 
28 PERB 1J3065 (1995): 
7
 See State of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control), supra note 2. 
aSee County of Niagara, supra note 4. See also Clinton Community College, 31 
PERB 1J3070 (1998), where the recognition clause was title specific but the unit 
clarification petition was dismissed because the titles sought were not listed in the 
recognition clause. 
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seniority or benefits." It is, therefore, clear from the recognition clause of the collective 
bargaining agreement that substitute bus drivers are included in the unit and that the 
parties have reached an agreement as to the level of benefits to be received by the 
substitute bus drivers pursuant to the agreement. 
• We are furtherpersuaded that in_a casesuch asthis involving aoinit clarification-
petition, where the at-issue title is so clearly included in the recognition clause of the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement, the contract itself should be the end of our 
inquiry. 
In Florida Union Free School District,9 (hereafter Florida) we looked to the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement to set the terms and conditions of employment 
for the term of the contract. We there held that: 
...when the parties have negotiated and reached an 
agreement on the item, the contract then defines the term 
and condition of employment, and actions taken pursuant 
thereto can no longer be labeled unilateral. In essence, the 
parties have, for the duration of the contract, waived their 
right to complain about such actions.10 
We find that the reasoning underlying the rationale articulated in Florida that the 
parties may set the terms of their contract and that for the duration of the contract those 
terms will mark the limit of our inquiry into unilateral actions involving those terms, 
notwithstanding an extra-contractual practice involving a term of the contract, is 
931 PERB1J3056, at 3117 (1998). 
^Citing Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB j[4625, at 4759 (1981), a/fd, 
15PERBp025(1982). 
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applicable to a recognition clause which details those employees who will be covered 
by the contract. Just as the employer in a unilateral change case may revert to the 
language of the contract as setting forth the parties' agreement as to a term or condition 
of employment notwithstanding a past practice to the contrary, then the parties to a 
collective bargaining agreementihat clearlyjdef^ 
may revert to that recognition clause as defining the unit, notwithstanding a past 
practice to the contrary. We reiterate that this decision is limited to a unit clarification 
petition in which the unit is clearly defined in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement and the title or titles in-issue are specifically made part of the recognition 
clause, even though the parties' practice may have been to exclude the title from 
subsequent negotiations.11 
Finally, we are mindful of the intent of the Legislature that all uncertainties as to 
representation ofemployees be resolved in favor of Taylor Law coverage.12 Our 
decision here reflects the Board's long-standing policy of resolving representation 
disputes in favor of coverage, unless exclusion of the at-issue employees is clearly 
mandated by the Act.13 
11Given the nature of this proceeding, we need not address any potential issues 
related to the absence of negotiations on behalf of the substitute bus drivers or the 
reasons therefor. 
12See State of New York, 5 PERB 1J3001 (1972). See also County of Rockland, 
28 PERB ^3063(1995). 
J 13See State of New York (SUNY), 24 PERB 1J3035 (1991). 
J 
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We, therefore, reverse the decision of the ALJ and grant the unit clarification 
petition. We find that the title of substitute bus driver is included in the unit represented 
by CSEA. Because of our determination on the unit clarification aspect of the petition, 
we need not reach the exceptions taken to the ALJ's determination on the unit 
placementportionjoLCSEAlsi petition.I4 ,
 = 
DATED: February 29, 2000 
Albany, New York ^7 , fif} 
Lsy-jC^-, 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
^Inasmuch as the addition of the substitute bus drivers to CSEA's unit does not 
bring into question its continuing majority status, no election is ordered. See New York 
Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 27 PERB 1J3034 (1994). 
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BOARD DECISION ON MOTION AND ORDER 
The charging party, Sara-Ann P. Fearon, has moved this Board to reconsider our 
decision and order previously issued on January 24, 2000. 
Board - U-20760 -2 
Having reviewed the moving papers, we determine that there is neither such 
newly discovered material nor overlooked propositions of law as to justify 
reconsideration of our Decision and Order of January 24, 2000. 
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is denied.1 
DATED: February 29, 2000 ,. ; 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
re A. Abbott, Member 
/NtJvN. 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
1See Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist, 25 PERB 1J3027 (1992); New York City 
Transit Auth., 24 PERB 1J3030 (1991); Capital Dist. Reg'l. Off-Track Betting Corp., 20 
PERB 1J3026 (1987); East Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist, 17 PERB 1J3044 (1984); Board of 
Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 7 PERB fl3039 (1974). 
